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ATTORNEYS' FEES: WHAT CONSTITUTES A "BENEFIT"
SUFFICIENT TO AWARD FEES FROM
THIRD PARTY BENEFICIARIES
I. INTRODUCTION
As a general rule, a court of law does not have power to award at-
torneys' fees to a successful litigant.' A court of law may assess
"costs" against a losing party, 2 but in the United States "costs" do not
1. E.g., Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 391 (1970); Fleischmann
Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714, 717 (1967); Arcambel v. Wise-
man, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 306 (1796); Gordon v. Woods, 202 F.2d 476, 479 (1st Cir.
1953); In re Continental Vending Machine Corp., 318 F. Supp. 421, 424 (E.D.N.Y.
1971); Hornstein, Legal Therapeutics: The "Salvage" Factor in Counsel Fee Awards,
69 HARv. L. REv. 658 (1956) [hereinafter cited as Legal Therapeutics].
This rule, of course, may be altered by statute. A few federal statutes provide for
mandatory fee shifting where a plaintiff has been injured by their violation. E.g.,
Clayton Act § 4, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1963) (private antitrust action); Communications
Act of 1934, § 206, 47 U.S.C. § 206 (1971) (actions against a common carrier).
Statutes may also provide for discretionary fee shifting. E.g., Civil Rights Act of
1964, § 204, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-3(b) (1970) (segregation in places of public accom-
modation); Securities Act of 1933, § 206, 15 U.S.C. § 77k(e) (1971) (false registra-
tion statement).
2. "Costs" had their origin in the Roman law, where the author of a groundless
suit had to reimburse his adversary for the expenses incurred in defending his legal
rights. The author of the suit abused a privilege of citizenship by bringing a
groundless suit, and thus was to be punished. At the early common law, the English
crown levied an amercement against the plaintiff if he lost, thereby attempting to dis-
courage the prosecution of wrongful demands. Watson, A Rationale of the Law of
Costs, 16 CENT. L.J. 306, 306-07 (1883). The Statute of Gloucester, 6 Edw. I, c. 1
(1275) granted costs in certain actions to a successful plaintiff for the purposes of
discouraging wrongful defenses and reimbursing plaintiffs for their expenses. Later,
the Statute of Westminster, 4 Jac. I, c. 3 (1607), empowered courts of law to award
counsel fees to defendants in all actions where such awards might be made to plaintiffs.
Both English statutes included attorneys' fees as "costs". Goodhart, Costs, 38 YALE
L.J. 849, 852 (1929).
Today, "costs" are amounts taxable against the losing party to defray the expenses
the successful party incurred in pressing his cause. They are intended as punishment
against the defeated party for causing the litigation. Trust Co. of Chicago v. National
Sur. Corp., 117 F.2d 816, 818 (7th Cir. 1949); Vincennes Steel Corp. v. Miller,
94 F.2d 347, 348 (5th Cir. 1938); Goodhart, supra at 853. Costs, being statutory in
origin, cannot be levied by a court of law without express statutory authorization.
Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714, 717 (1967); Brad-
ford v. Southern Ry., 195 U.S. 243, 251 (1904); Day v. Woodworth, 54 U.S. (13
How.) 363, 372 (1852).
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ordinarily include attorneys' fees.' It is within the inherent power and
discretion of a court of equity, however, to grant attorneys' fees in ap-
propriate cases. 4  Historically, federal courts have granted fees in two
broad categories of cases.
A. Bad Faith Actions
One area in which fees are granted is where a party, by bringing an
unfounded suit or through procedural misconduct, calls his opponents'
attorney's fees upon himself as a penalty.6 The granting of fees for
3. E.g., Kansas City S. Ry. v. Guardian Trust Co., 281 U.S. 1, 9 (1930);
Peter Kiewit Sons Co. v. Summit Constr. Co., 422 F.2d 242, 274 (8th Cir. 1969).
But see 5 V.I.C. § 541(b) (1957) (attorneys' fees may be given in all cases as costs).
The reason for not following the English practice of awarding fees to the successful
litigant in all cases may rest in the psyche of the early American. When the Republic
was young, law was considered a body of rules any intelligent man could understand.
Paid attorneys were therefore considered not only unnecessary, but their retention
placed one's adversary, possibly a poor man, at a disadvantage. Awarding fees merely
for winning was therefore considered undemocratic and unfair, especially as lawyers
were considered rather shady characters at best. Accordingly, attorney fee provisions
were enacted in only a few states, and there they soon fell into disuse because of the
reluctance of legislatures to raise the statutory amounts to anywhere near the actual
costs of litigation. Goodhart, supra note 2, at 873-74.
4. Federal courts, which possessed equity jurisdiction, became endowed with all
the powers possessed by the English Court of Chancery at the time the Constitution
was adopted. Sprague v. Ticonic Nat'l Bank, 307 U.S. 161, 174 (1939); Waterman v.
The Canal-Louisiana Bank & Trust Co., 215 U.S. 33, 43 (1909); White v. Berry,
171 U.S. 366, 376 (1898); Mississippi Mills v. Cohn, 150 U.S. 202, 205 (1893);
McConihay v. Wright, 121 U.S. 201, 206 (1887); Russell v. Farley, 105 U.S. 433, 445
(1881); Payne v. Hook, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 425, 430 (1868); Fontain v. Ravenel, 58
U.S. (17 How.) 369, 384 (1855).
The courts of the common law only granted statutory costs, including attorneys'
fees, in certain types of actions. Chancery, whose goal was to do justice in each case,
had the inherent power to grant costs not otherwise governed by statute according to
the facts and circumstances of the case. Kansas City S. Ry. v. Guardian Trust Co.,
281 U.S. 1, 9 (1930); Newton v. Consolidated Gas Co., 265 U.S. 78, 82 (1924);
Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 460, 462 (1852);
Stallo v. Wagner, 245 F. 636, 638 (2nd Cir. 1917); Andrews v. Barnes[1888] 39
Ch. D. 133, 138. See A. EVERTON, WHAT Is EQuoi'y ABoUT? 8 (1970); Goodhart,
supra note 2, at 854. Chancery would grant attorneys' fees where a party made, but
could not sustain, gross charges of fraud and misconduct; where a suit was unjust,
vexatious, false, wanton or oppressive; and where a fiduciary relationship existed be-
tween the parties and the fiduciary was put to expense either in defending an un-
founded suit or in administering, protecting or preserving the trust or pledged property.
Guardian Trust Co. v. Kansas City S. Ry., 28 F.2d 233, 241 (8th Cir. 1928), rev'd on
other grounds, 281 U.S. 1 (1930). See Goodhart, supra note 2, at 861-62.
5. Except when helpful in the interpretation of federal court decisions, the actions
of state courts are outside the scope of this note.
6. E.g., Universal Oil Prods. Co. v. Root Ref. Co., 328 U.S. 575 (1946) (fraud
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1972/iss2/5
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"bad faith" is analogous to "costs", as they are intended as punishment
upon the defeated party,7 the purpose being to deter unnecessary liti-
gation and unfair litigious practices.8 In practice, this discretion is
used sparingly. Courts are reluctant to punish one for bringing or
defending what is considered to be an uncertain enterprise. In addi-
tion, it is felt the poor will be discouraged from initiating suits if the
penalty for losing includes paying opponents' attorney's fees.'
B. Third Party Beneficiaries
The second category of cases in which fees are allowed is to a
plaintiff from third parties where the plaintiff's successful suit confers
a benefit upon them.10 This doctrine derived from the ancient rule
that a trustee, because he is under a duty to act for others, is entitled to
his expenses in administering the trust from the trust fund. 1 Where
the trustee refuses to act to preserve or protect the fund, a beneficiary
under it can act in the trustee's name.' 2 If one creates, protects, or
increases a fund in which others are interested, he could be said to be
acting as a trustee vis-d-vis the others. Because one is to be encour-
aged to act as a trustee, and because individual recovery seldom war-
rants the expense of bringing suit, it was determined by the Supreme
upon the court in conduct of a suit); Rude v. Buchhalter, 286 U.S. 451 (1932)
(fraud between the parties); Toledo Scale Co. v. Computing Scale Co., 261 U.S. 399
(1923) (contempt of court); Rolax v. Atlantic Coast Line Co., 186 F.2d 473 (4th
Cir. 1950) (plaintiff suing to vindicate a right); Even-Cut Abrasive Bond & Equip.
Corp. v. Cleveland Container Co., 171 F.2d 873 (6th Cir. 1949) (patent infringe-
ment); Cleveland v. Second Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 149 F.2d 466 (6th Cir. 1945)
(fiduciary put to expense in defending an unfounded suit); Bernstein v. Brenner,
320 F. Supp. 1080 (D.D.C. 1970) (charge of fraud made but not sustained).
7. See notes 4 & 6 supra.
8. Goodhart, supra note 2, at 862, 876.
9. See, e.g., Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714,
718 (1967); Missouri Pac. R.R. v. Slayton, 407 F.2d 1078, 1082 (8th Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 395 U.S. 937 (1969), rehearing denied, 397 U.S. 1081 (1970).
10. E.g., Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375 (1970); Central R.R. &
Banking Co. v. Pettus, 113 U.S. 116 (1885); O'Hara v. Oakland County, 136 F.2d
152 (6th Cir. 1943).
11. See, e.g., Harken v. Brundage, 276 U.S. 36 (1928); Meddaugh v. Wilson,
151 U.S. 333, 343 (1894); Guardian Trust Co. v. Kansas City S. Ry., 28 F.2d 233,
245-46 (8th Cir. 1928); Hornstein, The Counsel Fee in Stockholder's Derivative Suits,
39 COLUM. L. REv. 784, 786-87 (1939) (hereinafter cited as Stockholder's).
12. Winton v. Amos, 255 U.S. 373 (1921). The beneficiary however, unlike the
trustee, had to win his suit, as he was under no duty to act for the others. Stock-
holder's, supra note 11, at 790.
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Court in Trustees v. Greenough,' that a successful plaintiff so acting
is entitled to contribution for all his litigation expenses, including at-
torney's fees, from those who share in the fund.14  Recovery can be
based upon two theories, either of which is sufficient. A plaintiff can
be viewed as representing all those interested and suing for them on a
common cause of action, thereby allowing him fees as the agent of
all;15 or, since to allow others to participate in the fund without con-
tribution would enrich them unjustly at the expense of the plaintiff,
recovery can be granted upon quasi-contract.'
After Trustees, courts began to find it both equitable and necessary
to require third parties benefiting from another's suit to contribute to
the plaintiff's litigation expenses in additional types of cases. As courts
have extended the granting of fees, the continuing problem has been
to determine what constitutes a "benefit" so that its conferral upon
another will require him to contribute to the expenses of the suit pro-
curing it. This note will explore what a "benefit" has been, what it
is today, and what it may be tomorrow.
11. ALLOWING FEES FOR NON-PECUNIARY BENEFITS
A. Sprague v. Ticonic National Bank
Trustees showed that third party beneficiaries were liable for contri-
bution for expenses incurred in bringing a fund into court. It logically
followed that one should be awarded recovery if he established, not a
fund, but the right to a fund. In the landmark case of Sprague v.
Ticonic National Bank,17 plaintiff and fourteen others had trust funds
in Ticonic. The monies were secured by bonds while on deposit in
the bank pending investment. Ticonic then failed, and another bank
assumed its indebtedness. When the second bank also failed, a com-
mon receiver was appointed. Plaintiff filed a bill against the banks
and their receiver to impress upon the proceeds of the bonds a lien for
13. 105 U.S. 527 (1881).
14. Id. at 532-33.
15. Id. at 534.
16. Id. at 532. The benefited party had to accept the benefit conferred so that
the court could find, in effect, some sort of implied agreement between the parties not
unlike the agency argument itself. This was deemed necessary to circumvent the
general rule that one who confers a benefit upon another who does not request it is
not entitled to contribution from the benefited party. See RESTATEMENT, REs=rrr-
TION § 106 (1937).




her trust deposit. After plaintiff succeeded in establishing the lien,"8
she brought this action to recover her counsel's fees and other litiga-
tion expenses from the fund created by the sale of the bonds. The
lower courts denied recovery on the ground it was beyond the power of
a federal district court to make such an award.' 9 The Supreme Court
reversed, holding that all federal courts have broad discretionary power
to award attorneys' fees in equity suits,20 which power is properly ex-
ercised where a plaintiff recovers a common fund." The present case,
the Court analogized, was merely a variant of the fund cases.22 Here,
although the fund was not brought into court, the right of the other
beneficiaries to the proceeds was established by stare decisis.23
The stare decisis effect, the Court said, could be a sufficient enough
benefit to the third parties to require contribution.24 The case was
remanded to the district court for an actual determination on the merits
of the case.-5 In making its decision, the district court was to look to
the totality of the facts, remembering that awards of attorneys' fees
"are appropriate only in exceptional cases and for dominating reasons
of justice. 20
Sprague dealt with the inherent power of federal courts to award
attorneys' fees. That power is broad; courts may grant them at their
discretion whenever they determine there is a "dominating reason of
justice." Although Sprague analogized to the fund cases, the benefit
in the case was non-pecuniary. The groundwork was therefore laid
for a more general acceptance of non-pecuniary benefits.
B. Shareholder Derivative Suits
By another analogy to the trustee precedent, courts granted success-
ful plaintiffs, suing derivatively, attorneys' fees from the corporation
18. Id. at 162-63.
19. Id. at 163.
20. Id. at 164.
21. Id. at 166.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 168.
24. Id. at 167.
25. On remand, the district court found that the plaintiff had been put to consider-
able expense in her suit and that she had conferred a benefit upon others. Therefore,
the court concluded, this was a proper case in which to award attorneys' fees. Sprague
v. Ticonic Nat'l Bank, 28 F. Supp. 229, 230 (S.D. Me. 1939). Recovery was the
full amount of her legal expenses incurred in bringing the original action. Id. at 231.
26. 307 U.S. at 167.
Vol. 1972:271] 275
Washington University Open Scholarship
276 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
when their suit resulted in monetary recovery by the corporation.27
Because all the shareholders benefit by such a suit, as owners of the
corporation,28 and because the corporation is a sort of a fund,20 recov-
ery could be permitted out of it.30 As a separate entity, the corpora-
tion also benefits, for a derivative suit is on a cause of action belonging
to the corporation.31 Therefore, fees could be granted upon either
agency or quasi-contract, as to the corporation or the shareholders col-
lectively. Agency, standing alone, would appear to permit recovery
by any plaintiff who brings a derivative suit. The courts, however,
require the suit to be successful. Reasoning that success is a measure
of meritoriousness, a plaintiff by winning did only what the corpora-
tion or another shareholder should have done, and it is reasonable to
view him as their agent.3 2  After Sprague, since the basis for recovery
in derivative suits and the fund cases are indentical,38 there was no
reason to limit the awarding of attorneys' fees in derivative suits to cases
of pecuniary recovery.
C. Individual Shareholder Suits
An individual shareholder can sue an officer or director of a corpo-
ration for a breach of their fiduciary duty to him.34 Because there is
present in such a case neither agency with the corporation nor with
all the shareholders, because the suit is upon a private cause of action,
and because only the individual shareholder benefits, a plaintiff can
not recover his attorney's fees.3"
27. E.g., Waters v. Disbrow & Co., 70 F.2d 572 (8th Cir. 1934); Hutchinson
Box Board & Paper Co. v. Van Horn, 299 F. 424 (8th Cir. 1924); Colley v. Wolcott,
187 F. 595 (8th Cir. 1911); Steinberg v. Hardy, 93 F. Supp. 873 (D. Conn. 1950);
Coyler v. Atlantic & N.C.R.R., 132 F. 570 (C.C. E.D.N.C. 1904). Recovery in a
derivative suit adheres to the corporation, not to the individual litigant. See H. HENN,
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS ENTERPRISEIS § 373
(2d ed. 1970).
28. H. HENN, supra note 27, at § 373.
29. Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 394-95 (1970).
30. See cases cited note 27 supra.
31. The corporation, though listed as a defendant, is in actuality a plaintiff.
Stockholder's, supra note 11, at 796.
32. See cases cited note 27 supra.
33. That is, a policy to encourage suits coupled with the theories of agency and
unjust enrichment.
34. See H. HENN, supra note 27, at § 360; Stockholder's, supra note 11, at 785.




The line between individual and derivative suits has never been clear.
The breach of an officer's or director's duty to a shareholder often in-
volves a breach to the corporation as well. 6 In Holthusen v. Edward
G. Budd Mfg. Co.,3 7 an individual, suing for himself, was granted at-
torneys' fees from the corporation after he secured an injunction pro-
hibiting the directors from issuing stock options to executives on the
inequitable terms established in the company by-laws. The result ob-
tained by the suit, retention of assets in the corporation, was equivalent,
the court said, to the creation of a fund.3 8 This result benefited both
the corporation and the shareholders.39 The case, therefore, was the
same as if it were a derivative suit, and the plaintiff was entitled to his
attorney's fees.4
By adopting Sprague into the corporate context, Holthusen set the
stage for an increase in the number of cases in which fees could be
granted. Courts could henceforth look to the result obtained, not the
form of the action, 4' and the benefit could be non-pecuniary in nature.
Shareholder suits were to be encouraged, because they protect minority
stockholder rights, police corporations, and deter corporate mismanage-
ment. And one way to encourage suits, which are expensive, is through
the granting of attorneys' fees.42 HoIthusen, then, prepared the way
for the tests for a "benefit."
I. THE SUBSTANTIAL BENEFIT TEST
A. Development of the Test
When pecuniary recovery was necessary to an awardance of fees,
courts willingly granted them. If a plaintiff won, it was fair upon un-
just enrichment grounds to have the benefited third parties contribute
36. H. IENN, supra note 27, at § 360.
37. 55 F. Supp. 945 (E.D. Pa. 1944).
38. Id. at 947.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Traditionally, legal remedies weren't given in an equitable derivative suit, nor
equitable relief in a legal individual suit. Cf. Schechtman v. Wolfson, 244 F.2d 537
(2d Cir. 1957). Further, the old view was that where an individual suit was legal, it
could not be joined with a derivative suit. After Holthusen, the trend was to permit
joinder. H. HENN, supra note 27, at § 353.
42. E.g., Angoff v. Goldfine, 270 F.2d 185, 192 (1st Cir. 1959); Holthusen v.
Edward G. Budd Mfg. Co., 55 F. Supp. 945, 946 (E.D. Pa. 1944); H. HENN, supra
note 27, at § 358; Stockholder's, supra note 11, at 791.
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to the expenses of the suit. Agency could also be found in the as-
sumption the others would have brought the suit if the plaintiff had
not. Once non-pecuniary recovery was enough to entitle a plaintiff
to fees, however, courts became concerned over the possibilities of
nuisance and strike suits, especially in the corporate context.43  To
forestall that development, courts felt they needed a standard by which
to measure the benefit conferred. They finally settled upon requiring
a "substantial" benefit.4 4 In Bosch v. Meeker Cooperative Light &
Power Association4 5 a "substantial" benefit was defined as one which:
...must be something more than technical in its consequence and be
one that accomplishes a result which corrects or prevents an abuse
which would be prejudicial to the rights and interests of the corporation
or affect the enjoyment or protection of an essential right to the share-
holder's interest.4"
This standard, intended to deter nuisance SUitS,4T bears no relation-
ship to the theoretical underpinnings of allowing recovery of fees at
all.48 In practice it was used to limit the granting of fees. Schectman
v. Wolfson,49 where the test was born, is a good example of how it
operates in practice. In Schechtman, plaintiff brought a derivative suit
aimed at interlocking directorates in competing corporations, a viola-
tion of Section 8 of the Clayton Act.5 0 The court, although acknowl-
edging both that the general rule was to allow fees in successful deriva-
tive suits whether or not a fund is recovered,5 ' and that private suits
to enforce the law were to be encouraged,5 2 denied the plaintiff's at-
torney's fees because the claimed benefits were not substantial. 58
43. "A 'strike suit' is an action brought by a security holder, not in good faith,
but, through the exploitation of its nuisance value, to force the payment of a sum dis-
proportionate to the nominal value of his interest as the price of discontinuance."
Note, Extortionate Corporate Litigation: The Strike Suit, 34 COLUm. L. REv. 1308
(1934).
44. Schechtman v. Wolfson, 244 F.2d 537, 540 (2d Cir. 1957).
45. 257 Minn. 362, 101 N.W.2d 423 (1960).
46. Bosch v. Meeker Co-op Light & Power Ass'n, 257 Minn. 362, 367, 101 N.W.2d
423, 427 (1960).
47. Schechtman v. Wolfson, 244 F.2d 537, 540 (2d Cir. 1957).
48. That is, fees are awarded to a plaintiff because he acts for others or confers a
benefit upon them. After Sprague and Holthusen, any limit placed upon the quantity
of the benefit necessary was purely arbitrary.
49. 244 F.2d 537 (2d Cir. 1957).
50. 15 U.S.C. § 19 (1963).
51. 244 F.2d at 539-40.
52. Id. at 539.




Arguably, however, if the court in Bosch was correct in its defini-
tion of the test,54 both the corporation and its shareholders received
benefits through plaintiff's suit. The corporation had its affairs
straightened out,r5 and the shareholders saw public confidence in the
corporation restored.50 Recovery could have been premised upon
agency, as the plaintiff brought the corporation into line with federal
statutory policy, or upon unjust enrichment, as he had enhanced the
value of the corporate stock. In addition, the policy of encouraging
plaintiffs to redress corporate mismanagement and enforce federal poli-
cies was certainly present.57
Schechtman recognized that fees could be granted if a court found
the non-pecuniary benefit to be "substantial." As Holthusen had
shown, there was no reason to confine recovery to derivative suits.
In Bakery & Confectionery Workers of America v. Ratner,58 attorney's
fees were granted a union member who, by securing injunctive relief
to stop union officials from continuing to engage in acts of malfeasance
in office, conferred substantial benefits upon the union and all its
members.5 9
B. The Substantial Benefit Test in Practice
Because the substantial benefit test was indefinite by definition, and
because fees were granted at the discretion of the court, it was inev-
itable that holdings would vary. A few patterns have emerged, how-
ever, which are still with us today.
Where recovery is pecuniary, attorneys' fees are awarded upon un-
just enrichment grounds irrespective of the form of action or the nature
of the third party beneficiary.60 It has been held, at least where the
54. See note 46 supra and accompanying text.
55. See Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 396 (1970); United States
v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 111 F. Supp. 614, 616 (S.D.N.Y. 1953).
56. See Ratner v. Bakery & Confectionery Workers Int'l Union of Am., 354 F.2d
504, 506 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
57. E.g., Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 396 (1970); Newman
v. Piggie Park Enterprises, 390 U.S. 400, 402 (1968); Stockholder's, supra note 11,
at 791.
58. 335 F.2d 691 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
59. The benefits were: cessation of pilfering from the union treasury, strength-
ening of the pension fund, introduction of proper accounting procedures, and requir-
ing union officials to act in accordance with the union constitution. Id. at 696.
60. E.g., Freeman v. Ryan, 408 F.2d 1204 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (class action, bene-
fit to similarly situated individuals outside class); Jones v. Uris Sales Corp., 373 F.2d
Vol. 1972:27 1]
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benefited party is an organization, that a pecuniary judgment is
enough, even if it is not actually collected."' A few older cases denied
recovery where the court could not find an implied contract between
the plaintiff and the benefited parties. 62  That position is a clear mis-
reading of the letter and spirit of the fund cases, and is not followed
today.
Where the benefit conferred is non-pecuniary, there is more diver-
gence in the opinions. Most courts, following Schechtman, look to the
nature of the benefit conferred. Thus, recovery of attorneys' fees has
been allowed in situations like Sprague, where a plaintiff by his suit
establishes the right of others to a fund"3 or establishes others' claims
arising out of a common cause of action,64 even if the proceeding is
administrative in form.65 Some courts even today deny recovery of
fees where the benefit is non-pecuniary and they cannot find an im-
plied contract with those benefited.6" On theoretical grounds, this po-
sition is as wrong here as in the case of pecuniary recovery. The real
reason these courts deny attorneys' fees is because they feel such an
award constitutes a windfall to the attorney. 7  In situations such as
Holthusen, where a plaintiff by his action retains money in an organi-
zation, fees are awarded.6 Recovery has been allowed where mem-
bers of an association filed a petition, in opposition to majority senti-
ment, requesting receivers be appointed for the association and a fund
644 (2d Cir. 1967) (derivative suit, benefit to corporation and shareholders); Beb-
chick v. Public Utilities Comm'n, 318 F.2d 187 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 373 U.S.
913 (1963) (class action benefited other individuals); Powell v. Pennsylvania R.R.,
267 F.2d 241 (3d Cir. 1959) (union class action, benefit to non-union employees);
Smolowe v. Delendo Corp., 136 F.2d 231 (2d Cir. 1943) (derivative suit benefited
corporation); Philadelphia Elec. Co. v. Anaconda Am. Brass Co., 47 F.R.D. 557
(E.D. Pa. 1969) (class action; benefit to all class members even if didn't want suc-
cessful attorney). See Wright, Class Actions, 47 F.R.D. 169, 185 (1969).
61. Teamster's Local 107 v. Cohen, 220 F. Supp. 735 (E.D. Pa. 1963).
62. Lea v. Paterson Sav. Inst., 142 F.2d 932 (5th Cir. 1944); Abbott, Puller &
Myers v. Peyser, 124 F.2d 524 (D.C. Cir. 1941).
63. Gibbs v. Blackwelder, 346 F.2d 943 (4th Cir. 1965).
64. Doherty v. Bress, 262 F.2d 20 (D.C. Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 934
(1959).
65. Honda v. Mitchell, 419 F.2d 324 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
66. See, e.g., Schleit v. British Overseas Airways Corp., 410 F.2d 261 (D.C. Cir.
1969); Preston v. United States, 284 F.2d 514 (9th Cir. 1960).
67. Cf. cases cited note 66 supra.
68. E.g., Globus, Inc. v. Jaroff, 279 F. Supp. 807 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); Teamster's




was later created when the association went into receivership."0 Sim-
ilarly, an award was made to an attorney for a shareholder who noti-
fied the corporation that certain named directors were engaging in short
swing profits and the corporation itself later recovered from the di-
rectors.7o
A few courts, instead of looking to the type of benefit conferred,
look to whom is benefited. In these cases, which have arisen only in
an organizational context, the courts attempt to distinguish between
benefits accruing to the organization as an entity or the members col-
lectively, on the one hand, and benefits to members if less than all, on
the other. If the benefit to the individuals "outweighs" those to the
organization or the members collectively, fees are denied.71 Fees have
also been denied an attorney-shareholder who brought a derivative
suit, on the theory an attorney is more likely to bring a nuisance suit
because he receives the fee. 72  The better view would be to do as the
majority of the courts and not weigh the benefit among the benefi-
ciaries. Attorneys' fees should be awarded, in relation to the value of
the benefit conferred, from all benefited third parties.73
As the substantial benefit test has been used, then, pecuniary re-
covery is always "substantial." In non-pecuniary cases, where the
courts have discretion to look to the parties benefited or to determine
what kind of a benefit is "substantial," the results vary. While most
courts are liberal, there exists the opportunity to be niggardly. This
latter attitude may work hardship upon plaintiffs who have valid claims
but not the money to sue. This is especially true in the corporate
context, where suits are expensive to maintain. Such an attitude
clashes with both the policy of encouraging shareholder suits and the
policy of encouraging private persons to act as private attorney generals
by vindicating federal statutes.7 4  Because it is so easy to vitiate
those policies through use of the substantial benefit test, that test has
recently been extended.
69. Buford v. Tobacco Growers' Co-op Ass'n, 42 F.2d 791 (4th Cir. 1930).
70. Gilson v. Chock Full O'Nuts Corp., 331 F.2d 107 (2d Cir. 1964).
71. E.g., Missouri Pac. R.R. v. Slayton, 407 F.2d 1078 (8th Cir. 1969); Cutler v.
American Fed'n of Musicians of U.S. & Can., 231 F. Supp. 845 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).
72. Giesecke v. Pittsburgh Hotels, 82 F. Supp. 64 (W.D. Pa. 1949), aff'd, 180 F.2d
65 (3rd Cir. 1950).
73. See Murphy v. North Am. Light & Power Co., 33 F. Supp. 567 (S.D.N.Y.
1940). Cf. Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375 (1970).
74. See notes 44-73 supra and accompanying text.
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IV. THE SUBSTANTIAL SERVICE TEST
A. Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co.
In Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co.,75 plaintiff sought to dissolve a
merger under Rule 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, for-
bidding solicitation of shareholders' votes by a materially misleading
proxy statement. 76 The Supreme Court determined the solicitation to
be misleading, and remanded to the district court for the proper relief.
The Court granted plaintiff's petition for an award of counsel's fees
from the company despite the facts that the ultimate relief was un-
known and that other sections of the Act specifically granted plaintiffs'
attorneys' fees, 77 whereas Section 14(a) did not.78  The general rule,
the Court said, is to grant a plaintiff attorneys' fees where he benefits
a class as himself.79  Here the plaintiff vindicated a breach of a fi-
duciary duty owed to the corporation by a director. Because it is the
purpose of Section 14(a) to insure fair and informed corporate suf-
frage, the plaintiff, by fulfilling that purpose, "rendered a substantial
service to the corporation and its shareholders."8' 0 That service was
enough to entitle plaintiff to an award of fees from the corporation."
B. Mills Analyzed
Some courts have viewed Mills as merely adding one more limited
exception to the general rule prohibiting the granting of attorneys'
fees.8 2  The Court in Mills, however, implied the decision was not to
75. 396 U.S. 375 (1970).
76. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1963).
77. §§ 9e and 18a (15 U.S.C. §§ 78i(e) and 78r(a)) of the Act deal, respec-
tively, with manipulation of security prices and misleading statements in documents
filed with the SEC. The Court cited Smolowe v. Delendo Corp., 136 F.2d 231, 241
(2d Cir. 1943) as authoriy that those two provisions do not hamper a court in its
granting of additional remedies for violations of other provisions of the Act because
they only provide for additional punishment of wrongdoers in those specific situa-
tions. 396 U.S. at 390.
78. § 14(a), in fact, fails to even provide for a private right of action. That de-
fect had been cured by implication in the case of J.1. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426
(1964). The Court, then, was not dealing with a case where there were detailed
statutory remedies, as were present in Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing
Co., 386 U.S. 714 (1967), and therefore ignored the arguments utilized in Fleisch-
mann to deny fees to the plaintiff.
79. 396 U.S. at 392.
80. Id. at 396.
81. Id.
82. See, e.g., Bangor & Aroostook R.R. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen &
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1972/iss2/5
ATTORNEY'S FEES
be narrowly read."' Based upon the rationale employed in Mills, there
is no reason to limit its application to either securities cases or deriva-
tive suits.
The Court determined that the plaintiff conferred upon the corpo-
ration a substantial service. A "service" is qualitatively different from
a "benefit" as used in the substantial benefit test. "Benefit" connotes
the conference of something tangible upon third parties;s4 a "service,"
on the other hand, is a helpful act, a good turn, useful labor that does
not produce a tangible commodity. 5 There was no pecuniary recov-
ery in Mills, nor a chance of any on remand.8 6  By going through an
analysis of the substantial benefit test, and grounding its decision on
that line of cases, 7 the Court could only have meant to extend the
meaning of "benefit" to include services performed for others. One
service for which fees could be awarded is the establishing of a statu-
tory violation by one's fiduciary. Mills thus impliedly overruled cases
such as Schechtman, where fees were denied for the vindication of a
statutory wrong. 8
The Mills Court also talked of "corporate therapeutics," that attor-
neys' fees are necessary to encourage corporate suits because they pro-
mote deterrence and redress of malfeasance by corporate officials.,
This type of argument is equally applicable in non-corporate situations
where one in a position of authority violates a statutory or common law
Enginemen, 442 F.2d 812 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (fees denied union which recovered monies
due members and the union itself by certain railroads); Yablonski v. United Mine
Workers of Am., 314 F. Supp. 616 (D.D.C. 1970) (administrator of deceased union
activist refused fees in cases where deceased had showed union discriminated against
him in elections for union office).
83. 396 U.S. at 391.
84. In the fund cases, there was direct pecuniary recovery. In Sprague and
Holthusen, and the cases which follow them, there was eventual pecuniary recovery.
Fees were merely granted one or two steps removed in the process. See notes 60-70
supra and accompanying text.
85. WEDSTER'S SEvEmrH NEw COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 783 (1963).
86. 396 U.S. at 389, 396.
87. Id. at 393-96.
88. See notes 50-56 supra and accompanying text.
89. The term "corporate therapeutics" was coined by Professor Hornstein and ex-
pounded in two extremely influential law review articles, The Counsel Fee in Stock-
Holder's Derivative Suits, 39 COLUM. L. Rlv. 784 (1939) and Legal Therapeu-
tics: The "Salvage" Factor in Counsel Fee Awards, 69 HARv. L. Rlv. 658 (1956). The
former of these articles was relied upon by the court in Holthusen v. Edward G. Budd
Mfg. Co., 55 F. Supp. 945, 947 (E.D. Pa. 1944), and has been cited by numerous
other courts.
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fiduciary duty. In the hands of a sympathetic court, the liberality of
Mills could be translated into social therapeutics. 0
Sufficiency, a standard by which to measure the meritoriousness of a
suit, has been deemed necessary, where fees are granted for non-pe-
cuniary benefits, to prevent nuisance suits." In its form of "substan-
tiality," retained by the Court in Mills,"2 it allows an unsympathetic
court to place an uncertain burden of proof upon the plaintiff. 3  The
expense of bringing an unmeritorious suit, however, which can be easily
measured by equating meritoriousness with victory, should in itself pro-
vide a sufficient deterrent to nuisance suits. As federal courts can re-
view and approve any settlement of a class action or derivative suit,14
collusion should be prevented. The courts can also vary the amount
of the fee granted. If the plaintiff wins, his suit is per se meritorious,
and he should recover at least nominal fees. Quantum meruit for more
important cases would, of course, be higher, thus encouraging the vin-
dication of important statutory policies. 5 As a last resort, and for a
flagrant case, the court could invoke the bad faith doctrine and grant
fees to the plaintiff's opponent. 6 Therefore, if suits to vindicate stat-
utory duties and policies are to be encouraged, it would make more
sense to drop the requirement of "substantiality." That requirement
is not only vague, but can be used to vitiate the very policies the rule
is intended to encourage.
If Mills is carried to its logical extension, there should be a new rule
in non-pecuniary third party beneficiary cases: When a plaintiff deter-
mines a third party's legal rights in a matter in which the plaintiff also
has a legal interest, the third party is liable for contribution to plain-
tiff's attorney's fees.
C. Problems with the Rule: Causation
Where the plaintiff's suit has gone to final judgment, or there has
been a court-approved settlement, there is no problem in finding a
90. See p. 288 infra.
91. See notes 43-47 supra and accompanying text.
92. 396 U.S. at 396.
93. See Comment, Shareholder Suits: Pecuniary Benefit Unnecessary for Counsel
Fee Award, 13 STAN. L. REv. 146, 150 (1960).
94. FED. R. Crv. P. 23(e), 23.1, 23.2.
95. See Comment, Attorneys' Fees in Shareholder Derivative Suits: The Substantial
Benefit Rule Reexamined, 60 CAL. L. 11v. 164, 190 (1972) [hereinafter cited as
Reexamined].




"determination" of another's legal rights. Where, however, the plain-
tiff has taken some sort of affirmative action and the defendant then
acts to correct the abuse, the problem of causation arises. Several
courts, where the suit has been settled prior to final determination, have
used as a standard whether plaintiff's suit was sufficient to withstand
a motion to dismiss. 97 One commentator, taking that as a starting
point, has suggested the following: Where a suit becomes moot by de-
fendant's unilateral act after plaintiff files his suit, the ability of the
allegations to withstand a motion to dismiss should be sufficient unless
the defendant can produce evidence he contemplated the move prior
to knowledge of plaintiff's actions and that he was not motivated by it.
Ability to withstand a motion to dismiss would also be sufficient if
settlement is made after the motion is denied. However, if a settlement
is made prior to the time a suit is filed or before defendant contests it
in any way, to allow defendant the benefit of the doubt the plaintiff
should have to show his claim can withstand a motion for summary
judgment. This higher requirement should prevent collusive suits by
requiring the plaintiff to show the defendant should have acted on his
own. If a settlement results from arbitration, no further test of the
merits is necessary."' This scheme seems reasonable for, by adopting
a minimal standard, it promotes suits, while retaining the requirement
of meritoriousness.
D. Problems with the Rule: Windfall Aspects
In cases of non-pecuniary recovery, courts are sometimes reluctant
to allow attorneys' fees where to do so takes on the appearance of giv-
ing the attorney involved a windfall. 99 Since the attorney receives the
reasonable value of his services measured by the total value of the bene-
fit conferred on everyone,' he may be able to recover fees from people
97. See, e.g., Kahan v. Rosenstiel, 424 F.2d 161 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied, 398
U.S. 950 (1970); Schechtman v. Wolfson, 244 F.2d 537 (2nd Cir. 1957); Globus, Inc.
v. Jaroff, 279 F. Supp. 807 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
98. Reexamined, supra note 95, at 189-90.
99. See notes 60-67 supra and accompanying text.
100. Absent a stipulated or contingent fee arrangement, the attorney will receive
as compensation the reasonable value of his services. The determination of that
value is a matter of discretion for the trial court. See, e.g., Ratner v. Bakery & Con-
fectionery Workers Int'l Union of Am., 354 F.2d 504, 506-07 (D.C. Cir. 1965);
Angoff v. Goldfine, 270 F.2d 185, 193 (1st Cir. 1959); Legal Therapeutics, supra
note 1, at 682. If the trial court abuses its discretion, an appellate court may reduce
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he never even contemplated. Thus, an attorney for a plaintiff who
files a class action just prior to the running of the statute of limita-
tions, in which suit others join,1 1 but who later separate out and pur-
sue their own suits, 02 should receive fees from them if they recover. 0 3
Or, if a plaintiff brings a private antitrust suit without a prior govern-
mental action, 0 4 all who later bring actions in reliance upon plaintiff's
determination of defendant's liability should have to contribute to plain-
tiff's attorney. 0 5
Courts are liable in these situations to dredge up the discredited doc-
trine of implied contract 0 6 or find other reasons to deny fees to the
attorney. In light of Mills and its policy considerations, a better ap-
proach would be not to deny fees to the attorney, but to reward the
plaintiff. It is, after all, the plaintiff who is to be encouraged to sue.
This could be done in all cases by crediting any recovery of fees from
non-parties against the fees the successful plaintiff has paid or con-
tracted to pay his attorney. 10 7 It is arguable that this, in turn, unjustly
enriches the plaintiff vis-d-vis third parties. It is, however, the plain-
tiff who sued and took the risk of losing, and he should be rewarded
for his "pioneering spirit." For the same reasons, an attorney who
himself brings the suit should not be denied reasonable fees.
V. POST MILLS DEVELOPMENTS
Mills has received a mixed reception in the lower federal courts.
the fee awarded. See, e.g., Lucern Investment Co. v. Estate Belvedere, Inc., 411 F.2d
1205, 1207 (3rd Cir. 1969).
101. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c) (2) allows a court to hold open a suit for a reasonable
time to allow other members of the class to join.
102. FED. R. Civ. P. 21 provides for separation out.
103. Cf. Philadelphia Elec. Co. v. Anaconda Am. Brass Co., 47 F.R.D. 557 (E.D.
Pa. 1969). But see Wright, Class Actions, 47 F.R.D. 169, 181 (1969).
104. The United States may bring an antitrust suit, and any final judgment or de-
cree entered in a governmental suit is prima facie evidence against the same defendant
in a subsequent private suit. 15 U.S.C. § 16(a) (1963).
105. In order to prevail in a treble damage suit, the plaintiff must show, in
addition to a violation of the antitrust laws by the defendant, which may be supplied
by an earlier suit, that he suffered a pecuniary injury to his business or property
caused by defendant's violation. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1963). See E. TIMDERLAKE,
FEDERAL TREBLE DAMAGE ANTTusT AcTIONS 18-26 (1965); Comment, Causation
for Treble Damages-Section 4 of the Clayton Act, 32 U. PiTr. L. REV. 193 (1970).
106. See note 66 supra and accompanying text.
107. See Gibbs v. Blackwelder, 346 F.2d 943, 946 (4th Cir. 1965); In re Conti-
nental Vending Mach. Corp., 318 F. Supp. 421, 432-33 (E.D.N.Y. 1971). Cf. Hobbs




The reception has been generally favorable. In Bright v. Philadelphia-
Baltimore-Washington Stock Exchange,108 plaintiff member of the Ex-
change obtained a declaratory judgment that he had been wrongfully
kept from the governing board of the exchange by the incumbent mem-
bers. He was granted his attorney's fees from the exchange because
by his action he preserved the integrity of the exchange, which action
"confer[red] a type of benefit upon the exchange and its members."109
In one area, however, there has been considerable controversy.
Plaintiffs have attempted to use the Mills rationale to extract fees from
the losing party and not from a benefited third party. In these cases
the courts have split. Fees have been assessed against defeated de-
fendants in civil rights and securities cases.
Lee v. Southern Home Sites Corporation10 involved a civil rights
suit against a defendant who discriminated in selling home lots. The
plaintiff was awarded fees from the defendant because the court
deemed it necessary to effectuate the Congressional policy of eliminat-
ing racial discrimination."'
In Kahan v. Rosenstiel,"1 2 plaintiff shareholder sued certain direc-
tors and the controlling shareholder of the corporation for a violation
of Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,113 alleging
misrepresentation of a tender offer. The controlling shareholder sold
all his stock to a second corporation, and announcements were issued
stating an equivalent offer would be forthcoming to the rest of the
shareholders. When the offer turned out to be too low, the plaintiff
instituted suit, both individually and derivatively. Later, the offering
corporation raised its offer to equivalent terms. Plaintiff then peti-
tioned for his litigation expenses from the defendants. The lower
court granted defendants' motion to dismiss, and the Court of Appeals,
after determining that plaintiff's suit stated a cause of action, reversed.
Citing Mills, the court held that if on remand plaintiff could establish
a violation of 10(b), the defendants would be liable for fees. 14
108. 327 F. Supp. 495 (E.D. Pa. 1971).
109. Id. at 506. See Rosen v. Public Service Elec. & Gas Co., 328 F. Supp. 454
(D.N.J. 1970); Fischman v. Wexler, 309 F. Supp. 976 (D. Del. 1970).
110. 444 F.2d 143 (5th Cir. 1971).
111. Id. at 144-45.
112. 424 F.2d 161 (3rd Cir. 1970).
113. 15U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1971).
114. 424 F.2d at 174.
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The implied rationale in the preceding two cases is that, as private
suits to redress statutory policies and breaches of fiduciary duties are
to be encouraged, and as the determination of another's legal right is
sufficient to require him to contribute, then the plaintiff through his
suit confers a substantial service upon the defendant, and it is as fair
to assess fees against him as against third parties. Those cases which
have refused to assess fees against the defendant have rejected this ar-
gument on the ground that to so do constitutes, in essence, "punish-
ment," which cannot be inflicted upon a losing party without some
further showing of bad faith." 5  This is the better view. Bad faith
is a distinct and separate ground for awarding attorneys' fees. Where
fees are awarded on that basis, courts have traditionally found the suit
to be oppressive, vexatious or fraudulent."" Those grounds should
not be confused with conferring benefits upon third parties. The
Court in Mills, in fact, alluded to that difference when it stated that
fees are not given in the ordinary case as punishment." 7
In civil rights cases, granting fees against a defendant may be de-
sirable. It does not appear unreasonable to find bad faith where one
knowingly denies to another his constitutional rights, thereby forcing
the injured party to sue. To eliminate confusion, however, decisions
so holding should clearly label their actions as proceeding upon bad
faith grounds."S
In other cases of statutory redress outside the civil rights area, where
bad faith may not be as clear, if the defendant is an official of an or-
ganization or an elected governmental official, fees could be awarded
by adopting a theory of "social therapeutics." Redressing the organi-
zational wrong confers a benefit upon the organization, and therefore
the organization is liable for fees. In the case of a governmental offi-
cial, where it is his responsibility to enforce a law, or take action under
it, and he refuses, then a determination of his responsibility innures
to the benefit of the public, and fees should be recovered from the
115. See Walker v. C.B.S., Inc., 443 F.2d 33 (7th Cir. 1971); Bangor & Aroostook
R.R. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen & Enginemen, 442 F.2d 812 (D.C. Cir.
1971); de Haas v. Empire Petroleum Co., 435 F.2d 1223 (10th Cir. 1970).
116. See notes 4, 6-9 supra and accompanying text.
117. 396 U.S. at 396-97.
118. In Bradley v. School Board of City of Richmond, Va., 324 F. Supp. 401
(E.D. Va. 1971) the court assessed fees against the school board on bad faith




public treasury."' Recovery would be upon third party grounds, not
bad faith. Awards of attorneys' fees in these instances would effec-
tuate the policy of promoting individual suits to enforce statutory poli-
cies and at the same time would uphold the equally strong policy
against punishing a defendant without a further showing of bad
faith. 120
The court in Kahan, however, was clearly wrong. 2' The case, if
Mills were followed, called for an award from the corporation or all
the shareholders. Without an explicit showing of bad faith, fees should
not have been levied against the defendants. The Court in Mills was
careful to say determination of a right is not rewardable per se. Not only
is that punishment, but if courts can grant fees in such cases to the
plaintiff, then "they should be permitted to do the same thing for the
defendant when he succeeds in his defense, otherwise the parties are
not suffered to contend in an equal field."' 2  To allow this would
vitiate the very policy ground upon which the third party beneficiary
cases rest. A plaintiff if liable for his opponent's attorney's fees if he
loses will be discouraged, not encouraged, to sue.
VI. CONCLUSION
It may be that America should adopt the English practice of rou-
tinely assessing attorneys' fees from the losing party. 2 3 Courts should
not attempt to read Mills so broadly, however, as to reach that result.
A matter of such far reaching consequences is a reversal of all Amer-
ican practice and is much better left to the legislatures than imple-
mented through strained judicial interpretation. Mill's result, that all
third parties whose legal rights are determined by an interested plain-
tiff's suit are to contribute to the expenses of the suit, offers a sym-
pathetic court a tool of great social importance. But it is a limited
tool whose limitations must be recognized to enable it to be used more
efficiently within its stated bounds.
119. The plaintiff, of course, must be careful, especially when suing under state
statutes, to check whether the state has waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity from
suit. See Sincock v. Obara, 320 F. Supp. 1098 (D. Del. 1970).
120. See Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 396-97 (1970); Newman v.
Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 402 (1968); Fleischmann Distilling Corp.
v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714, 718 (1967).
121. See notes 112-15 supra and accompanying text.
122. Day v. Woodworth, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 363, 373 (1952).
123. Ehrenzweig, Reimbursement of Counsel Fees and the Great Society, 54 CAL.
L. REv. 792, 792-93 (1966).
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